Negligence claim fails in fitness center injury case

The conservator of a former Hennepin County judge appealed the dismissal of her ordinary negligence claim against a Minneapolis fitness center regarding the judge’s profound injury at the facility. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the claim was barred after concluding that the center’s Client Intake Form was enforceable to shield it from liability for claims that arose from its own negligence.

The person who was injured at the facility was Judge Fred Karasov. Karasov became an assistant Hennepin County attorney in 1982. In 2008, former Gov. Tim Pawlenty appointed Karasov to the bench.

Karasov joined Calhoun Orange’s fitness center in 2017. The franchise, which is no longer in operation, of Orangetheory Fitness, was located in the Uptown neighborhood of Minneapolis. Upon going through the membership process, Karasov signed a one-page “Client Intake Form.” The top of the form asked for demographic information, while the bottom of the form listed various fitness center policies.

In the center of the form, in smaller font than in other parts of the form, there were four enumerated paragraphs. The fourth-numbered paragraph read:

“Client has been informed that any fitness program includes possible risks and all exercises shall be undertaken at Client’s sole risk and discretion. Client assumes full responsibility for any and all damages, injuries or losses that may be sustained or incur, if any, while participating in any studio exercise program or physical activity. Client hereby waives all claims against the Studio, the Facility, the Studio instructors, officers, directors, employees or agents of either and/or any successor assigns or [sic] and all claims, demands, injuries, damages, actions, or causes of action, whatsoever to my person or property arising out of or connected to the services, facilities, exercise classes, or the facility where same is located (including the Studio and/or the Facility, as applicable). Client hereby agrees to indemnify [sic] defend, hold harmless, release and discharge the Studio and Facility from all claims, demands, injuries, damage actions [sic] causes of action and from all acts of active or passive negligence on the part of the Studio, the Facility, the Studio instructors, their servants, agents, employees, and/or any successors and assigns, whatsoever, for any damages, injuries or losses that may be sustained by the Client arising from or in connection with the activities that Client voluntarily participates [sic], including without limitation, attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses of any litigation, arbitration or other proceeding.”

In 2019, Karasov was in an exercise class at Calhoun Orange when he suffered cardiac arrest. Upon collapsing, a class participant notified a trainer, who yelled for someone to call 911 and grab the automated external defibrillator (AED). While CPR was administered and 911 was called, the AED sat on the floor next to Karasov for 15 minutes.

Using the AED, the paramedics were able to resuscitate Karasov. However, Karasov was on life support for a while. Because of the prolonged deprivation of oxygen to his brain, he suffered significant brain damage. Now permanently disabled, Karasov requires a wheelchair, help with all basic activities, and constant supervision.

Tina Lund, who is Karasov’s conservator and partner, sued Calhoun Orange, alleging negligence, medical negligence, and negligent undertaking for not having an overall emergency procedure in place. But the district court granted Calhoun Orange’s motion for summary judgment. It found that the liability paragraph protected Calhoun Orange from Lund’s ordinary negligence claims, finding that the claims were barred by the text “[c]lient hereby waives all claims against the Studio … arising out of or connected to the services, facilities, exercise classes, or the facility where same is located.”

On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that, while the sentence that the district court cited failed under the strict construction standard, another sentence required them to affirm the dismissal: “[c]lient hereby agrees to indemnify … the Studio and Facility from all claims … and from all acts of active or passive negligence on the part of the Studio, the Facility, the Studio instructors, their servants, agents, employees, and/or any successors and assigns.”

Before the Minnesota Supreme Court was the question of whether the liability-shifting provision was enforceable. It found that it was.

Jacob Siegel, partner at Ciresi Conlin, who represented Lund, asserted that the court must use strict construction in interpreting the provision — in other words, determining “whether its meaning is unmistakable to an ordinary Minnesotan.” Siegel argued that the provision was “contradictory, unclear, and equivocal.” He maintained that Calhoun Orange could have drafted a clear and unequivocal exculpatory clause giving its members fair notice of rights they were waiving. “The clauses were so carelessly drafted, lengthy, and convoluted, that an ordinary person would not understand the scope of valuable rights they were waiving,” Siegel argued.

Representing Calhoun Orange, Julia Nierengarten, partner at Meager + Geer, asserted, “The provisions themselves do not conflict. One does not say the opposite of the other. It’s simply that one is enforceable, the other is not. One is broader, the other is narrower.”

Applying the strict construction standard, the court found that the form manifested a clear and unequivocal intent by Calhoun Orange and Karasov to shield the fitness center from claims that arose from its own negligence. Although the court noted that it was a “close case,” it ultimately found that reading the two sentences together demonstrated intent to shield Calhoun Orange.

While the court found that sentence three—the sentence that the district court cited in its award of summary judgment—would be unenforceable against claims of negligence, it concluded that sentence four remedied the problem. Nor did the court find that the sentences contradict one another.

“Because a party’s understanding of the liability paragraph would have necessarily included both sentence three and sentence four, we find it illogical to retroactively sever sentence three from the contract simply because we now deem it unenforceable against claims of negligence,” wrote Justice Gordon Moore. “We therefore hold that where a liability paragraph contains two liability-shifting clauses of diverging scope, these clauses must be read together, placing the court in the shoes of the parties signing the contract.”

Justices Anne McKeig, Sarah Hennesy, and Theodora Gaïtas took no part in the decision. Former Justice Christopher Dietzen, who retired in 2016, was appointed to participate.